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INTRODUCTION
“A trademark works as a symbolic handshake.”1 It assures the
superiority of the mark to anyone, anywhere looking to make a
purchase.2 Before the age of railroads, interstate commerce, and
industrialization, most goods were produced and sold locally.3
There was no pressing need to distinguish one store from another,
because everyone in town looking to buy Brittany’s Breads knew
1

Laura A. Heymann, The Law of Reputation and the Interest of the Audience, 52 B.C.
L. REV. 1341, 1385 (2011).
2
See id.
3
See Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in
Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 575–76 (2006).
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exactly who Brittany was.4 This symbolic handshake was far from
being merely symbolic.5 Goodwill was formed on the basis of a
person’s reputation as perhaps a meticulous dressmaker or as
someone who provided quality service.6 The handshake between
the seller and the patron guaranteed the service.7 But then, the
population grew and urbanized.8
Transcontinental railroads
opened, permitting goods to ship to consumers nationwide.9 As a
result, the handshake that once guaranteed quality needed to be
expressed in a different, symbolic way, and with that came the
expansion of trademark law.10
One way to establish a mark’s identity for today’s broader
consumer base is through trademark branding. Modern marketing
science has found parallels between branding and its effects on
memory and the legal concept of acquired distinctiveness.11 A
positive brand experience is embodied in a good memory, with
“[t]he strongest brands in the world own[ing] a place in the
consumer’s mind.”12 It takes a mere fifty milliseconds—one
twentieth of a second—for consumers to create their opinions
about websites.13 Given that a consumer’s perception of an entire
website is formed that quickly, it is inconceivable that it would
take much longer for a person to form a response to a mark used in
product placement.
This Note will argue that unsponsored product placement
dilutes a trademark by blurring its identity with that of the media in
which it was placed.14 Finding trademark incorporation in product
placement to be a commercial use of a mark under the Lanham
4

See id.
See id. at 575.
6
See id.
7
See Heymann, supra note 1, at 1385.
8
See Bone, supra note 3, at 576.
9
See id.
10
See id. at 578–79 (noting that prior to 1870, there were a total of 62 trademarks in
the US, a stark contrast from the 100 filed annually between 1907 and 1909).
11
See Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive
Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 512–13 (2008).
12
Id. at 516 (quoting SCOTT M. DAVIS, BRAND ASSET MANAGEMENT: DRIVING
PROFITABLE GROWTH THROUGH YOUR BRANDS 3 (2000)).
13
See id. at 508.
14
See infra Part III.
5
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Act, will allow brands to retain ultimate control over how their
marks are perceived. This will accordingly diminish the risk of
trademark dilution. Part I of this Note will look at trademarks,
how they are diluted, and the occasions where unauthorized use is
exempted from causing dilution.15 Part II will analyze the
conflicting degree of protection trademarks are granted in
unauthorized product placement.16 Finally, Part III will argue that
trademarks should be viewed as a commercial use when
incorporated into media and, to prevent the risk of dilution, their
use in product placement should only be permitted with the
markholder’s authorization.17
I. TRADEMARK LAW AND THE NEED TO PROTECT A BRAND’S
REPUTATION
To identify a brand to consumers and differentiate it from its
competitors, companies apply trademarks to their products and
services.18 To be successful these marks must be distinctive.19
Trademarks that become generic lose their protection, as they can
no longer distinguish a brand.20 Similarly, dilution is defined to be
the use of a mark which “impairs the distinctiveness” of the
mark.21 There are only limited occasions during which a mark
may be used without the markholder’s permission.22 This
introduces confusion into the characterization of product
placement, and begets the question whether a reasonably prudent
consumer can sufficiently differentiate a trademark from its use in
product placement to prevent dilution.

15

See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
17
See infra Part III.
18
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 274 (1987).
19
See id. at 273.
20
See Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Rethinking the Parameters of Trademark Use in
Entertainment, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1023 (2009).
21
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2012).
22
See id. at § 1125(c)(3).
16
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A. What is a Trademark?
A trademark provides a shorthand by which consumers may
recognize the maker of a good or service, that maker’s reputation,
and the quality of everything associated with the maker’s
trademark.23 It permits a “company to ‘brand’ itself and
distinguish its goods and services from those of its competitors.”24
Once a mark has branded itself and attained consumer approbation,
trademark owners must make sure they continue investing in the
quality of their services and products so that consumers remain
loyal.25 To help in this endeavor, trademarks are granted federal
protection under the Lanham Act by holding civilly liable:
[a]ny person who . . . uses in commerce any word,
term, name, symbol, or device . . . which—(A) is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or
association of such person with another person, or
as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or
her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person . . .26
The Lanham Act protects uses of a mark in commerce.27 As
used in the statute, the word commerce references all commerce
that Congress may legally regulate under the Commerce Clause.28
In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court outlined three
occasions when Congress may act under its Commerce Clause
powers—it can regulate (1) channels of commerce, (2) instruments
of commerce or things and people in commerce, and (3) economic
activity that has a substantial effect on commerce.29 In line with
this definition, the commercial use of a trademark is found when:

23
See Landes & Posner, supra note 18, at 269; see also Top Tobacco, L.P. v. N. Atl.
Operating Co., 509 F.3d 380, 381 (7th Cir. 2007).
24
Lesli Harris, The New Old Spice: Business Identities, Trademarks, and Social
Media, 31 MISS. C. L. REV. 309, 310 (2012).
25
See Landes & Posner, supra note 18, at 270.
26
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012). The Lanham Act also provides for federal
registration of a trademark. See Harris, supra note 24, at 310.
27
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
28
See id. § 1127.
29
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995).
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(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their
containers or the displays associated therewith or on
the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of
the goods makes such placement impracticable,
then on documents associated with the goods or
their sale, and (B) the goods are sold or transported
in commerce . . .30
It is also a use in commerce if the mark is placed “on services
when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of
services . . . .”31
The Internet is considered an instrument of commerce that
Congress can regulate.32 The Eleventh Circuit further found that
the Internet’s global nature and extensive reach permits it to
function as an instrument of commerce even where there are no
actual sales.33 Therefore, the mere act of creating an online home
page that provides access to all users has been found to meet the
Lanham Act’s “in commerce” requirement.34 The two marks must
simply be the same or practically the same, meaning alike enough
that a sufficiently large portion of target consumers believe the
derivative mark is identical to the protected mark.35 For example,
the expansive use of a mark on the Internet that was similar to
Cable News Network’s CNN mark was found to impinge upon
CNN’s ability to differentiate itself from its competitors in Cable
News Network, L.P., L.L.L.P. v. CNNews.com.36 Accordingly, the
30

15 U.S.C. § 1127.
Id.
32
See United States v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 919, 921 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v.
MacEwan, 445 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Hornaday, 392 F.3d 1306,
1311 (11th Cir. 2004).
33
See Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1194–96 (11th Cir.
2001). For a similar holding in the Fourth Circuit, see Cable News Network, L.P. v.
CNNews.com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506, 517–18 (E.D. Va. 2001), aff’d in part, vacated in
part sub nom, 56 F. App’x 599 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that the offering of news and
information on the Internet could be characterized as the use of a trademark in commerce
under the Commerce Clause).
34
See Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629 (KMW),
1997 WL 133313, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997), aff’d, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998).
35
See Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 518 F.3d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Thane
Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2002)).
36
177 F. Supp. 2d at 519.
31
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Fourth Circuit held the cnnews.com website, which served as a
source of news and information to Chinese-speaking people around
the world but neither sold nor offered to sell goods outside of
China, to be a use in commerce that created a possibility of
Similarly, in Visa
economic harm to the CNN mark.37
International Service Association v. JSL Corp., the District of
Nevada found the use of the EVISA mark for an online homepage
and domain name to be a use in commerce that was likely to dilute
the well-known VISA mark.38 The possibility of dilution is just
one of the harms from which the Lanham Acts attempts to shield a
trademark.39
B. Threats to a Trademark’s Strength
A trademark’s reputation can be “gamed, possessed, and lost; it
is valuable or priceless; [and] it can be borrowed or lent.”40
Though a markholder has control over the product it produces and
introduces to the public, it is the consumers who are ultimately
responsible for determining how the product is assessed and for
dictating its reputation.41 Accordingly, as the value of a trademark
can fluctuate, it must avoid any “distracting and inappropriate
associations” which could threaten genericide or dilution.42

37
See id. at 521. Although under the 1995 Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA),
the Fourth Circuit required proof of more than the possibility of harm, actual harm is no
longer required. See Deborah R. Gerhardt, The 2006 Trademark Dilution Revision Act
Rolls out a Luxury Claim and a Parody Exemption, 8 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 213, 217
(2007).
38
See Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n v. JSL Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1313, 1316, 1320–21
(D. Nev. 2008), aff’d, 610 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that the dilution standard has
changed to likelihood of dilution and then finding dilution because use of EVISA on the
Internet as a homepage and domain name was a use in commerce that was likely to cause
dilution).
39
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012).
40
Heymann, supra note 1, at 1366.
41
See id. at 1342.
42
See Landes & Posner, supra note 18, at 307; see also Corina I. Cacovean, Is Free
Riding Aided by Parody to Sneak Between the Cracks of the Trademark Dilution Revision
Act?, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 441, 453–54 (2009) (noting Posner’s explanation
that dilution could result when a junior user free rides on a famous trademark’s goodwill
and risks turning it generic).
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1. Genericide
Markholders must police their marks and prevent them from
being reduced to generic words, or the traditional adjectives used
to describe products.43 Generic terms may not be registered and
protected under the Lanham Act.44 In deciding whether a word is
generic, courts look to dictionary definitions of the word, how
competitors use the word, how the alleged markholder uses the
word, how media uses the term, national testimony from people in
that industry, and consumer surveys pertaining to the word.45
Therefore, a mark that is, for example, used such that it becomes a
household name with no substitute means of connoting the
product, has become generic and is no longer protected under the
Lanham Act.46 Pilates, for example, became generic after it was
mentioned repeatedly on local and national news and entertainment
programs as a form of exercise rather than as the source of services
or equipment.47 Similarly, the mark MURPHY BED became
generic for a bed that folds into a wall in part because of
newspapers’ and magazines’ use of the term as a description for
this particular kind of bed.48 Another way a markholder risks
losing protection is if its mark is diluted.

43

See, e.g., Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2007);
Premier Nutrition, Inc. v. Organic Food Bar, Inc., No. SACV 06-0827 AG (RNBx), 2008
WL 1913163, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2008).
44
See Landes & Posner, supra note 18, at 291.
45
See, e.g., Henry Heide, Inc. v. George Ziegler Co., 354 F.2d 574, 576 (7th Cir.
1965) (finding the term “jujubes” generic, in part, due to extensive use of the term by
manufacturers in consumer advertising); Colt Def. L.L.C. v. Bushmaster Firearms, Inc.,
No. Civ.04–240–P–S, 2005 WL 2293909, at *22 (D. Me. Sept. 20, 2005); Gaylord
Entm’t Co. v. Gilmore Entm’t Grp., 187 F. Supp. 2d 926, 937 (M.D. Tenn. 2001) (citing
Nat’l Baseball Hall of Fame v. All Sports Promotion Grp., Inc., No. 99-CIV-3635
(KMW), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1592, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2001)).
46
See Henry Heide, Inc. v. George Ziegler Co., 354 F.2d 574, 576 (7th Cir. 1965)
(finding the term “jujubes” generic, in part, due to extensive use of the term by
manufacturers in consumer advertising); Colt Def. L.L.C. v. Bushmaster Firearms, Inc.,
No. Civ.04–240–P–S, 2005 WL 2293909, at *22 (D. Me. Sept. 20, 2005).
47
See Pilates, Inc. v. Current Concepts, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 2d 286, 302 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
48
See Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 101 (2d Cir.
1989).
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2. Dilution
For Judge Posner, a successful brand hinges on a consumer’s
ability to instantly identify a product and accordingly, “know[]
whom to hold responsible if the brand disappoints and whose
product to buy in the future if the brand pleases.”49 Trademark
dilution is founded on the policy that the distinguishing nature of a
mark should be preserved.50 The Trademark Dilution Revision Act
of 2006 (TDRA) states that trademark dilution occurs when an
individual adopts an owner’s original mark in commerce, once that
senior mark has become famous and acquired distinctiveness.51
The first person to use a mark within the United States is the senior
user, and the later person to adopt the mark, here the person with
the diluting mark, is the junior user.52
Prior to the TDRA, under the 1995 Federal Trademark Dilution
Act (FTDA), Mosley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. read dilution to
require a finding of actual harm, rather than simply a “likelihood”
of harm.53 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, held that the
mere “mental association” between Victor’s Secret, a lingerie store
in Kentucky, and Victoria’s Secret would, “not necessarily reduce
the capacity of the famous mark to identify the goods of its owner,
the statutory requirement for dilution under the FTDA.”54 The
TDRA was thus enacted in response to the Mosley holding, with
the intent of broadening the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
dilution law so that it better protected senior marks.55
The TDRA only requires injured parties to show that the
infringing party “commences use of a mark or trade name in
commerce that is likely to cause dilution.”56 The 2006 revision

49

Ty, Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002).
See Cacovean, supra note 42, at 444.
51
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2012).
52
See 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 26:5 (4th ed. 2012).
53
Mosley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003).
54
Id.
55
See Katya Assaf, The Dilution of Culture and the Law of Trademarks, 49 IDEA 1,
43 (2008) (explaining that many scholars believe this revision increased the scope of
trademark protection).
56
15 U.S.C § 1125(c)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
50
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also requires the original mark to be famous.57 Posner explains
that only after this point, where a trademark has become successful
and easily identifiable to consumers, must a markholder worry
about dilution.58 Dilution can occur if the famous mark is subject
to blurring or tarnishment.59
3. Blurring
Frank Schechter was the first person to describe what is now
known as dilution by blurring.60 In 1927, he explained that if
trademarks are allowed to be “used on different classes of
goods, . . . there is not a single one of these fanciful marks, which
will not, if used on different classes of goods, or to advertise
different services, gradually but surely lose its effectiveness and
unique distinctiveness . . .”61 When the TDRA was passed in
2006, it adhered closely to this definition.62 There are several
factors the statute lays out for courts to consider when determining
whether there has been dilution by blurring: (1) the similarity
between the two marks, (2) the inherent or acquired distinctiveness
of the famous mark, (3) the owner of the famous mark’s use is
“substantially exclusive,” (4) the familiarity consumers have with
the famous mark, (5) the mark or trade name’s purposeful
association with the famous mark, and (6) the actual association
existing between the two marks.63
Although the likelihood of dilution requirement has lowered
the bar to establish dilution, the holder of an original mark must
57

See id.
See Ty, Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002).
59
See 15 U.S.C § 1125(c)(1).
60
See Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98
VA. L. REV. 67, 106 (2012).
61
Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV.
813, 829–30 (1927).
62
See 15 U.S.C § 1125(c)(2)(B) (“‘[D]ilution by blurring’ is association arising from
the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the
distinctiveness of the famous mark.”). It should also be noted that the TDRA’s standard
of likelihood of confusion differs from Schechter’s standard of actual confusion.
Compare Schechter, supra note 61, at 825 (noting that the law only protects infringement
if it injures a producer’s trade reputation or financial health), with 15 U.S.C § 1125(c)(1)
(requiring that a mark be “likely to cause dilution . . . regardless of the presence or
absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury”).
63
See 15 U.S.C § 1125(c)(2)(B).
58
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still show more than mere mental association between the two
marks.64 The statute has evolved over the years as can be
evidenced through the case Starbucks v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee.65
This case has been appealed and remanded a total of five times,
and each successive opinion has demonstrated a more nuanced
understanding of the TDRA.66 Starbucks alleged but failed to
prove that Wolfe’s Mr. Charbucks brand coffee was infringing
upon and diluting the Starbucks mark by blurring.67 In 2008, the
Southern District of New York held that the marks needed to be
substantially similar to establish blurring.68 The Second Circuit,
however, disagreed, explaining that the TDRA does not use words
such as “very” and “substantial” in conjunction with “similarity.”69
Moreover, the court explained that were the statute to compel a
finding of substantial similarity, the application of the remaining
five factors would necessarily be contingent on that finding.70
Since a statute should be read to give meaning to every word,71 the
court held that the TDRA did not require substantial similarity.72
In November of 2013, the Second Circuit revisited the Charbucks
label.73 It accepted the district court’s findings that the Starbucks
and Charbucks marks were only minimally similar due to
Charbucks’s Black Bear packaging and the words Mister or Blend
64

See Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 472, 476
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).
65
Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 5981 (LTS) (THK),
2005 WL 3527126 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2005), vacated, 477 F.3d 765 (2d Cir. 2007),
remanded to 559 F. Supp. 2d 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 588
F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2009). It was first heard in 2005 under the FTDA. See Starbucks, 559 F.
Supp. 2d at 474.
66
Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 736 F.3d 198, 202–05 (2d Cir.
2013) (reviewing the case’s procedural history—this case was appealed to the Second
Circuit in 2007, which held that the TDRA should apply, and was subsequently remanded
to the Southern District of New York in 2008, appealed to the Second Circuit in 2009,
remanded again to the Southern District in 2011, and is now on appeal at the Second
Circuit).
67
Starbucks, 2005 WL 3527126, at * 9.
68
Starbucks, 588 F.3d at 107.
69
Id. at 108.
70
Id.
71
See, e.g., Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1470 (2012) (quoting United
States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–539 (1955)).
72
Starbucks, 588 F.3d at 109.
73
Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 736 F.3d 198, 201 (2d Cir. 2013).
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which always accompany the Charbucks mark when it is used in
commerce.74 Upon balancing the six non-exclusive factors laid out
in the TDRA, the Second Circuit affirmed its previous holding that
the Charbucks mark was only nominally similar and therefore not
exemplary of dilution by blurring.75
The TDRA does not require the two companies to be in direct
competition, as they were in Starbucks, to establish dilution by
blurring.76 Nor does it matter whether the junior mark was used to
identify the company’s own goods, services, or business as falsely
being the product of the senior mark holder.77 Dilution by blurring
must simply establish that the unauthorized use is “whittling away”
at the senior, famous mark’s selling power.78
4. Tarnishment
The other statutory form of dilution is tarnishment, which
occurs when there is “association arising from the similarity
between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the
reputation of the famous mark.”79 One particular association for
which case law generally finds tarnishment is where a junior mark
associates itself with a famous mark to sell sex-related products.80
The complaint Ben & Jerry’s recently filed against Rodax
distributors might exemplify this standard for finding
tarnishment.81 Rodax created pornographic movies with titles such
as Ben & Cherry’s and Boston Cream Thigh, seeming paradigms
for tarnishment.82

74

Id. at 208.
Id. at 213.
76
See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10 CIV.1611 PKC,
2012 WL 1022247, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012).
77
See id. (explaining that blurring claims are not contingent upon a false designation
of origin claim).
78
See id. at *6.
79
15 U.S.C § 1125(c)(2)(C) (2012).
80
See V Secret Catalogue Inc., v. Mosley, 605 F.3d 382, 388 (6th Cir. 2010).
81
See Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Inc. v. Rodax Distribs, Inc., 12 CIV. 6734, 2012 WL
3888233, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2012).
82
See id. Other titles include Everything But the Butt, Hairy Garcia, Late Night
Snatch, Americone Cream, New York Super Fat & Chunky, Chocolate Fudge Bars,
Coconut 7 Lay-Her Bar, and Peanut Butter D-Cups, and Banana Clit.
75
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Though tarnishment of a trademark is prohibited, there are
certain exceptions to the TDRA where the unauthorized use of a
trademark is not found to cause dilution.
C. Exceptions to Trademark Infringement
First Amendment concerns in trademark dilution law have
resulted in exceptions for fair use, which includes comment,
criticism and comparative advertising, and parody.83 Two other
exceptions to dilution under the TDRA are news reporting and
commentary and any noncommercial use of a mark.84 This Note
will primarily consider the parody exception and its interplay with
noncommercial use.
1. The Fair Use Defense of Parody
The TDRA exempts “nominative or descriptive fair use, or
facilitation of such fair use, of a famous mark by another person
other than as a designation of source for the person’s own goods or
services” from being causes of action in dilution.85 Under the
nominative fair use doctrine, a trademark may be used where it is
(1) impractical to identify the product or service without the use of
the trademark, (2) limited to what is absolutely necessary to
identify the good or service, and (3) does not imply that the
markholder is responsible for, or has supported or paid for the
use.86 Descriptive fair use is conditioned on a trademark being
used in good faith, as an adjective, rather than as an indicator of
source.87 Under the fair use exception, individuals may advertise
or promote their product in such a way “that permits consumers to

83

See Tushnet, supra note 11, at 554.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)(3)(B)–(C).
85
Id. § 1125(c)(3)(A)
86
See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 102–03 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that
eBay, is allowed to use brands’ trademarks to advertise the products being sold on its
website, provided it does not imply the advertisement is being sponsored by the brand).
87
See Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, No. 11 Civ. 7875 (PAC), 2012 WL 701262, at *2–3
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2012), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 717 F.3d 295 (2d Cir. 2013). The
trademarked phrase “Own Your Power” was used as a headline on the cover of Oprah’s
magazine to describe the contents of the magazine. Moreover, the phrase could not be
seen to indicate the source of the magazine where the “O” trademark, the title “The
Oprah Magazine,” and the picture of Oprah were all prominently displayed.
84
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compare goods or services[,]” and they may parody, criticize, or
comment upon the famous mark’s goods, services, or owner.88
One scholarly article compiled judicial interpretations of
parody and defined it as a: “(1) literary or artistic work (2) that
seeks to comment upon or criticize another work (3) by
appropriating or mimicking elements of the original work, in order
to (4) create a new art work that makes ridiculous the style and
expression of the original (5) in a humorous fashion.”89 To find a
parody, the use must be one that specifically comments upon the
famous mark, rather than simply a lifestyle or social trend.90
Similarly, the parody exception does not apply where a mark is
humorously portrayed just to promote the infringer’s own
product.91 Requiring the brand, rather than society, be parodied
has proven helpful in cases—it lessens the chances that the
consumer will mistakenly believe that the challenged use was
sponsored by or affiliated with the mark owner.92 One of the
earlier cases to be examined under the TDRA was Louis Vuitton
Malletier, S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, L.L.C.93
Haute Diggity Dog produces designer-inspired dog toys, such
as plush “Chewy Vuiton” handbags that are monogrammed with

88

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A).
Justin J. Gunnell, Evaluation of the Dilution-Parody Paradox in the Wake of the
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 441, 465–66
(2008).
90
See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10 Civ. 1611(PKC),
2012 WL 1022247, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012) (declining to find that the use of a
trademark was a parody where the infringing commercial’s intent was to avoid
commenting directly on the product owner’s mark).
91
See id. at *19 (citing Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 813 (2d
Cir. 1999)).
92
See id. at *23–24 (noting evidence from Twitter that showed actual consumer
confusion as to whether Louis Vuitton sponsored the Hyundai ad, a possible result of the
ad being a social rather than brand-specific commentary); see also Rosenblatt, supra note
20, at 1053 (explaining that people are less prone to believe that a markholder sponsored
a use of its mark if that use is negative or one that a typical markholder would not
authorize).
93
See generally Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, L.L.C., 507 F.3d
252, 262 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting that Haute Diggity Dog’s parody of the Louis Vuitton
trademark for dog toys that were designed and sold did not prevent the court from finding
the use to be a parody).
89
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“CV” marks and colored in Louis Vuitton inspired hues.94 The
Fourth Circuit found this use, despite its commercial nature, to be
an unquestionable example of a parody because, while the marks
on the Chewy Vuiton chew toy are aimed to invoke those on a
Louis Vuitton purse, the use was found to be in the spirit of humor
and mockery.95 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit found that the fame
of Louis Vuitton’s mark helped prevent confusion and furthered
Haute Diggity Dog’s endeavor to create a successful parody.96
2. The Noncommercial Use Exception
The legislative history of the TDRA defined commercial
speech as that arising from the commercial speech doctrine and
judicial precedent.97 One example of noncommercial speech is
artistic expression, the primary form that will be discussed in this
Note.98 In Schad v. Mount Ephraim, the Supreme Court explicitly
provided free speech protection to artistic works including “motion
pictures, programs broadcast by radio and television and live
entertainment such as musical and dramatic works.”99 The
Supreme Court first provided this protection to movies in Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, because movies are informative and
entertaining.100 The case then analogized movies to books,
newspapers, and magazines, finding that the profit-making nature
of each of these works was insufficient to deny free speech
protection.101 Various courts have followed the logic of these

94

Id. at 260. Other designer-inspired dog toys include “Chewnel No. 5,” “Furcedes,”
“Jimmy Chew,” “Dog Perignon,” “Sniffany and Co.,” and “Dogior.” Id. at 258.
95
Id. at 259–61 (noting the witty disparity between a luxury bag that is preserved in
good condition and a dog toy meant to be chewed and torn apart, the Fourth Circuit found
Haute Diggity Dog’s product to “convey two simultaneous—and contradictory—
messages: that it is the original, but also that it is not the original and is instead a
parody”) (quoting People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F. 3d
359, 366 (4th Cir. 2001)).
96
Id. at 261–62.
97
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 4, 8 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1031, 1035.
98
See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 812 (9th Cir. 2003)
(which restated the rule that artistic expression is noncommercial speech).
99
Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981).
100
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson 343 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952).
101
Id.
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holdings and extended it to include other forms of profit driven
entertainment such as comic books, T-shirts, and video games.102
In Rogers v. Grimaldi, the Second Circuit prescribed a test to
determine the level of free speech protection afforded artistic
works.103 It narrowly defined the occasions when artistic works
may be found in violation of the Lanham Act.104 It explained that
the Act will only apply where the mark “has no artistic relevance
to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it . . . explicitly misleads
as to the source or the content of the work.”105 Though the burden
to prove artistic relevance under the Rogers test is low, where a
mark is overtly misleading, it will not be exempted from the
Lanham Act.106 With this in mind, it is understandable that the
artistic relevance of product placement is often debated.
D. Product Placement
Product placement is the calculated inclusion of a product and
its trademark in media, which then creates an association between
the product and the popular film or television show.107 The
presence of particularly placed products dates back to at least 1896
when the Lumière Brothers strategically included Sunlight Soap in
their short film Washing Day in Switzerland.108 Traditionally,
product placement occurred when a trademark was incorporated
into media in exchange for compensation by the markholder—be it
in the form of money and/or advertising.109 The practice took off
in the 1950s and has been growing in popularity ever since.110 To
102

6 MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 31:139.
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.; see also Dillinger, L.L.C. v. Elec. Arts Inc., No. 1:09-CV-1236-JMS-DKL, 2011
WL 2457678, at *6 (S.D. Ind. June 16, 2011) (“[A]ny connection whatsoever is enough
for the Court to determine that the mark’s use meets ‘the appropriately low threshold of
minimal artistic relevance.’”) (quoting Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999); Volkswagen A.G. v.
Dorling Kindersley Publ’g, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 793, 810 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (“[A] slight
risk of customer confusion will not necessarily defeat a First Amendment defense.”).
107
See Harris, supra note 24, at 311; see also Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1027–28.
108
See Len Glickman & Anita Kim, Product Placement and Technology:
Developments, Opportunities, and Challenges, 30 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1, 30 (2012).
109
See Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1028.
110
See id.
103
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appear in the James Bond film Skyfall, companies paid a
significant portion of the $200 million production costs of the
movie.111 Heineken, alone, was responsible for 45 million of those
dollars.112 However, for all of the companies paying to be
incorporated into movies and television, there are occasions where
product placement is unsponsored.113 Moreover, as viewers have
grown to believe that every instance of product placement must be
sponsored or approved by the markholder, it is questionable
whether they can discern the authorized from the unauthorized
uses.114
E. The Reasonably Prudent Consumer
In determining the likelihood that a consumer will be misled as
to the origin of a product due to trademark dilution, a consumer’s
sophistication may be considered.115 The Supreme Court defined
the reasonably prudent purchaser in 1878 as an “ordinary
purchaser in the exercise of ordinary care and caution.”116 Later
courts have expanded on this to describe the reasonably prudent
purchaser as “reasonably discerning,”117 reasonably intelligent and
discriminating,118 and able to settle matters of “confusion with a
minimum of effort and average intelligence (for the particular
market).”119 Factors contributing to consumer sophistication have
been found by courts to include the price of the product, the

111

See Benjamin Radford, Branding James Bond: Do Product-Placement Ads Work?,
LIVE SCI. (Nov. 21, 2012, 8:21 AM), http://www.livescience.com/24957-james-bondproduct-placement.html.
112
See id.
113
See Will Perkins, ‘Flight’: Budweiser and Stolichnaya Product Placement Gone
Wrong?, WIDESCREEN (Nov. 7, 2012, 3:03 PM), http://ca.movies.yahoo.com/blogs/widescreen/flight-budweider-product-placement-gone-wrong-200352757.html.
114
See Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1040.
115
See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10 Civ. 1611 (PKC),
2012 WL 1022247, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012).
116
McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 255 (1877).
117
Farm Serv., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 414 P.2d 898, 909 (1966).
118
See Dell Publ’g Co. v. Stanley Publ’ns, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 126, 134 (1961).
119
Church of Larger Fellowship Unitarian Universalist v. Conservation Law Found. of
New England, Inc., No. 80-183, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15855, at *13 (D. Mass. June 29,
1983).
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purchasing process, consumers’ familiarity with the product, and
the purchaser’s overall knowledge.120
In Roederer v. J. Garcia Carrion, S.A., consumers’ reliance on
wine labels and similarity of names caused sparkling wine
purchasers to incorrectly believe that the manufacturers of Cristal
champagne also produced Cristalino.121 Beyond the similar names,
the labels of Cristal and Cristalino were notably alike—both had
gold front and neck labels with burgundy or maroon accents and
used similar typefaces.122 This was especially deceptive when the
two products were sold in the same stores and advertised in the
same publications.123 Though the price points may have been
different, this is not always enough to dissuade the sophisticated
consumer from finding the products to be associated.124 Even
advertisers believed the two marks to be related, calling Cristalino
“the other Cristal” or Cristal’s “younger brother.”125 For these
reasons, a significant portion of the surveyed consumers were
confused about the brands’ association, and whether Cristal was
the source or sponsor of Cristalino.126 The owner of a liquor store
was even unsure of the nature of the Cristal-Cristalino
relationship.127 Where consumers are blurring brands in spite of
using care, and in some cases professional judgment and decades
of experience, courts typically find that the reasonable consumer
would find brand association.128 When a trademark’s presence in
product placement is unauthorized, the question of whether the
reasonable consumer would assume a relationship, and whether
they might deem the use commercial or advertising enters into a
judge’s decision-making.129

120

See Arrow Fastening Co. v. Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384, 399 (2d Cir. 1995).
Roederer v. J. Garcia Carrion, S.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d 836, 877 (D. Minn. 2010).
122
Id. at 846, 849.
123
Id. at 868–69.
124
Id. at 842–43 (noting that most Champagne producers also have a less expensive
wine that they market to consumers).
125
Id. at 853.
126
Id. at 877.
127
Id. at 860.
128
See Xtreme Lashes, L.L.C. v. Xtended Beauty, Inc., 576 F.3d 221, 231 (5th Cir.
2009).
129
See Roederer, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 877–78.
121
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II. THE DIVERGING HOLDINGS ON TRADEMARK USE IN
UNSPONSORED PRODUCT PLACEMENT
Courts and scholars have differed over how to regard
trademark law in product placement.130 Some argue that product
placement use is an expressive noncommercial use.131 Others,
however, argue that the use of a trademark in unauthorized product
placement is advertising, which by its nature is commercial.132
The proponents of commercial use and dilution argue that blurring
ensues from viewers’ mistaken belief that the unauthorized use of a
mark in product placement is instead a sponsored use.133
Proponents of the contrary view assert that sophisticated
consumers can distinguish the use, or alternatively, that the use is
protected as a parody.134 These contrasting holdings show that
Elizabeth Rosenblatt, a professor at Whittier Law School, is
correct in noting that courts are at odds when it comes to labeling
unsponsored product placement a commercial or noncommercial
use.135
A. Courts Have Found the Use of a Trademark in Product
Placement to be Expressive and Artistically Relevant
Pratheenan Gulasekaram, a professor teaching at Santa Clara
Law, explains that movies are “primarily and overwhelmingly
noncommercial expressions with commercial elements sprinkled
throughout their artistic message.”136 Courts following this
reasoning and the Rogers v. Grimaldi test find the unauthorized
use of a mark in product placement to be an artistic use that is not

130

See Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1059–60.
See Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Policing the Border Between Trademarks and Free
Speech: Protecting Unauthorized Trademark Use in Expressive Works, 80 WASH. L.
REV. 887, 936 (2005) (asserting that movies are noncommercial expressions that
incidentally contain commercial elements).
132
See Matthew Savare, Where Madison Avenue Meets Hollywood and Vine: The
Business, Legal, and Creative Ramifications of Product Placements, 11 UCLA ENT. L.
REV. 331, 369–75 (2004).
133
See Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1053 (explaining the theory that consumers have
become increasingly aware of product placement and assume authorized use).
134
See Gulasekaram, supra note 131, at 929–31.
135
Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1059.
136
Gulasekaram, supra note 131, at 936.
131
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subject to the Lanham Act.137 Gulasekaram notes what movie and
television producers and directors argue—that the ultimate goal is
sale of the movie, television show, or media product, not the sale
of the product featured in the show.138 This argument, that the use
of a trademark in film is artistic, governed the Southern District of
New York’s holding in Louis Vuitton Mallatier, S.A. v. Warner
Brothers Entertainment Inc., which held that the use of an
unsponsored, and in fact counterfeit, Louis Vuitton bag in The
Hangover Part II was an artistic use.139 The “Lewis Vuitton” bag
was found to help unveil the character of its wearer, Alan, a
socially awkward, utterly oblivious individual.140 Accordingly, it
qualified as artistically relevant.141
Courts and scholars have found the use of a mark as product
placement to be expressive.142 Some go so far as to explain that
the trademark chosen is a superfluous detail, and omitting it would
not alter the final product, be it a movie, film, or some other media
production.143 Rosenblatt, in contrast, asserts that marks can be
more artistically relevant when they are used more realistically and
symbolically.144 This makes the mark’s use more necessary than
Gulasekaram, for example, finds.145 Rosenblatt explains that in
such seemingly genuine uses, viewers are disposed to later
associate the mark with a positive memory, no matter whether the
mark was depicted in a positive or negative light.146 Because the
mark is being used in such an expressive context, the use is labeled
noncommercial and is found not to dilute the strength of a mark.147
No matter why the mark is expressive, both authors argue that the

137

See Louis Vuitton Mallatier S.A. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 172,
178 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
138
Gulasekaram, supra note 131, at 936.
139
Louis Vuitton, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 178.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
See id.; see also Gulasekaram, supra note 131, at 936.
143
See Gulasekaram, supra note 131, at 936.
144
See Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1057 (citing studies of viewers’ reactions to
realistic use of trademarks versus gratuitous uses).
145
Compare id. with Gulasekaram, supra note 131, at 936.
146
Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1057.
147
Id. at 1060.
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use is noncommercial and not based in advertising.148 Those
paying for a mark to be used in product placement, however,
disagree with the notion that the advertising purpose is
irrelevant.149
B. Contrary to Some Courts’ Holdings, Markholders Paying for
Their Trademarks to Appear as Product Placement Intend the
Use to Increase Brand Recognition
Although some courts and scholars assert that directors only
endeavor to sell films, brands paying for product placement intend
for movie and television viewership to ultimately encourage their
products’ sales.150 Additionally, companies are investing in
product placement as a way to overcome the increased number of
viewers who use digital video recorders like TiVo to fast-forward
through commercials.151 A company’s aspiration to improve its
product sales through product placement appears reasonable since
history has revealed a correlation between the two.152 Products
seen in films have been found to entice consumers, resulting in
increased sales of the trademarked product.153 After the release of
E.T. The Extra-Terrestrial, sales of Reese’s Pieces tripled.154 The
movie Sideways encouraged wine drinkers to buy 22% more
bottles of Pinot Noir.155 Tom Cruise’s stint in Ray-Ban Wayfarer
sunglasses in Risky Business prompted consumers to buy
themselves a pair.156 Ray-Ban benefited again in 1997 after the
release of Men in Black, where the placement of its Predator 2
sunglasses prompted a 300% increase in sales, totaling almost five

148

See id.; Gulasekaram, supra note 131, at 936.
See Radford, supra note 111 (explaining that product placement may improve a
brand’s “cool factor” and it has the goal of increasing product sales).
150
Compare Gulasekaram, supra note 131, at 936, with Glickman & Kim, supra note
108, at 31–32.
151
See Glickman & Kim, supra note 108, at 31.
152
See Radford, supra note 111 (noting that although correlation does not necessarily
imply causation, product placement has continued to result in multi-million dollar
sponsorship deals).
153
See Gulasekaram, supra note 131, at 932.
154
See Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1029.
155
See id. at 1030.
156
See Glickman & Kim, supra note 110, at 30.
149
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million dollars.157 The opposite response can also occur—after
Clark Gable was seen sans undershirt in the movie It Happened
One Night, sales of men’s undershirts dropped approximately
40%.158
Beyond having an effect on sales, trademarks have helped, and
continue to help, carve out storylines and characters.159 James
Bond is partially defined by his Aston Martin, his Omega watch,
his never-ending collection of gadgets, and his vodka martini,
shaken, not stirred.160 Carrie Bradshaw became an unofficial
spokeswoman for Manolo Blahniks.161 The movie Le Divorce
repeatedly gave screen time to the Hermès Kelly Bag that Kate
Hudson’s character toted around Paris and eventually tossed over
the side of the Eiffel Tower.162 And, what is The Italian Job
without racing Mini Coopers?163

157

See VIKI ANTONOPOULOU, GEOR. NAT’L FILM CTR., PRODUCT PLACEMENT IN FILM 5
(Geor. Nat’l Film Ctr., 2010), available at http://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/
3504704/product-placement-in-film.
158
See Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1030–32 (describing the product placement
relationship as “symbiotic”).
159
See id. at 1027; see also Denise E. DeLorme & Leonard N. Reid, Moviegoers’
Experiences and Interpretations of Brands in Films Revisited, 28 J. ADVERTISING 71, 79
(1999); Glickman & Kim, supra note 108, at 31 (explaining that product placement can
improve the authenticity of a film and help viewers better understand and even empathize
with the plot and characters).
160
See Julian Sancton, For Your Ads Only: 50 Years of James Bond Product
Placement, BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/201204-05/for-your-ads-only-50-years-of-james-bond-product-placement (mentioning that
fans are so accustomed to the idea of James Bond’s vodka martini that they felt
“betrayed” upon finding out he would be a Heineken drinker in Skyfall, and called the
switch “sacrilege”).
161
See Guy Trebay, In His Shoes, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/fashion/manolo-blahnik-shoes-regain-it-status-infashion-world.html?_r=0&adxnnl=1&ref=sexandthecity&adxnnlx=1351969309vqIypPyfsqAfq949AawAvg (describing how Sarah Jessica Parker’s portrayal of Carrie
Bradshaw in Sex and the City transformed luxury shoemaker Manolo Blahnik into a
household name).
162
See Jessica Michault, Stealthy Screen Time: Prime Placement for Luxury Brands,
N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/28/arts/28iht-fhollywood.
1.5892325.html?pagewanted=all.
163
See Behind the Scenes: “The Italian Job”, MOTORTREND (May 2003),
http://www.motortrend.com/womt/112_0305_mini_bts/viewall.html?ti=v3 (calling the
car “one of the stars of ‘The Italian Job’”).
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Those specializing in product placement recognize that each of
these trademarks has helped movie producers depict the real world,
and their portrayal persuaded consumers to make these products a
part of their everyday lives.164 In fact, Philip Morris’ 1989
marketing plan recognized that “most of the strong, positive
images for cigarettes and smoking are created by cinema and
television . . . . It is reasonable to assume that films and
personalities have more influence on consumers than a static
poster.”165 This is in part because viewers perceive marks that are
used artistically as being a character’s authentic preference.166
Therefore, in striving to be like their favorite characters, viewers
are quick to purchase these now cultural symbols.167
In response to viewers’ copycat consumption habits, Congress
enacted the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act in 1965, which
prohibits the advertisement of cigarettes via any “electronic
communication” medium.168 In spite of this Act, Philip Morris
cigarettes continued to be featured in movies such as Grease,
Rocky II, Airplane, and Die Hard.169 The presence of cigarettes in
film, which is intended to promote society’s tolerance of cigarettes,
prompted statutory and common law restrictions upon using
cigarettes in product placement.170 This example helps to elucidate
the palpable clash between the camp advocating artistic expression
and those relying on the artistic use to increase the sales of its
products. Courts, unsure of where to draw the advertising-art line,
have wavered in their decisions and the routes they take to reach
their holdings.
164

See Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1029–30, 1042; supra text accompanying notes
155–60, 164.
165
C. Mekemson & S.A. Glantz, How the Tobacco Industry Built Its Relationship with
Hollywood, 11 TOBACCO CONTROL 82 (2002) at i82, available at http://tobaccocontrol.
bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i81.full.pdf+html.
166
See Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1057.
167
See id. at 1057, 1030 (“Study participants who viewed the movie Wayne’s World in
its entirety reported a purchase intention for placed brands that was 16% higher than for
brands they had previously identified as ‘favorites.’”).
168
15 U.S.C. § 1335 (2012).
169
See Mekemson & Glantz, supra note 165, at i84.
170
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1335; Council of Indep. Tobacco Mfrs. of Am. v. State, 713
N.W.2d 300, 311 (Minn. 2006) (noting that the settling cigarette manufacturers must
contribute money toward the health care costs that will arise from the use of their
cigarettes); Mekemson & Glantz, supra note 165, at i89.
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C. Some Courts Have Found Blurring as a Result of Unsponsored
Product Placement Because Viewers are Mistakenly Finding
Sponsorship
One reason that some courts have found product placement to
cause trademark dilution is the tendency of viewers to erroneously
assume that the trademark use was paid for or approved by the
markholder.171 Such implied sponsorship was found in Hyundai’s
2010 Super Bowl commercial, Luxury, which featured a basketball
with marks resembling Louis Vuitton’s trademark pattern: a
“pinwheel design, a diamond with an inset pinwheel design, and a
circle with an inset flower design.”172 The Louis Vuitton
basketball was admitted to have been embedded in the Hyundai
commercial to improve Hyundai’s reputation and create an image
that was more stylish and luxurious.173 This new-and-improved
image was unveiled on the televisions of the 106.5 million
Americans who watched the 2010 Super Bowl.174 Some of those
who viewed the commercial then tweeted about the “LV
basketball,” demonstrating that members of the commercial’s
audience had actually associated Louis Vuitton with the
advertisement and thought that the brand had been involved.175
Louis Vuitton contended that it was harmed by this consumer
deception because while “Hyundai ‘aspires’ to be a luxury brand,
[it] is not comparable to Louis Vuitton.”176 The commercial ended
171

See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10 Civ. 1611(PKC), 2012
WL 1022247, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012). The pattern on the basketball was held to
be “virtually indistinguishable” from the Louis Vuitton mark. Id. at *7.
173
Id. at *3 (Joel Ewanick, a former Hyundai marketing executive testified that “[t]he
Hyundai brand is one with significant deficiencies when you ask consumers what they
think about safety, what you think about amenities, what you think about styling, what
you think about performance . . . . But I would say generally speaking the idea was to
reframe the way people looked at Hyundai, the brand, and specifically through the eyes
of the Sonata.”). See generally Martin Nunlee et al., Negative Product Placement: An
Evolving Theory of Product Disparagement and Unfair Competition, 6 J. MARKETING
DEV. & COMPETITIVENESS 11, 14–19 (2012), available at http://www.nabusinesspress.com/JMDC/NunleeM_Web6_2_.pdf.
174
See Jonathan Stempel, Louis Vuitton Sues Hyundai over Super Bowl Ad, REUTERS
(Mar. 1, 2010, 2:06 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/01/louisvuittonsuperbowl-lawsuit-idUSN0125892920100301.
175
Louis Vuitton, 2012 WL 1022247 at *11.
176
Id. at *25.
172
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by asking, “What if we made luxury available to everyone?”177
For brands afraid of becoming part of the noise and losing
distinction, however, availability is the wrong message; they want
their trademarks to remain as luxurious as the goods they are
selling.178
The Southern District of New York agreed, finding that
because Louis Vuitton’s “marks ‘are famous and distinctive’ as
‘widely recognized luxury marks,’ and are ‘viewed by some as the
most valuable luxury brand in the world[,]’” they are entitled to
greater protection under dilution law.179 The six factors were
applied to find (1) similarity, with the marks on the basketball
declared “virtually indistinguishable” from those on a Louis
Vuitton product; (2) Louis Vuitton’s mark is distinctive; (3) Louis
Vuitton has engaged in “substantially exclusive” use of its mark;
(4) Louis Vuitton’s mark is well recognized; (5) Hyundai’s
association with the Louis Vuitton mark was purposeful; and (6)
evidence of actual association between the two marks.180
Accordingly, the Southern District of New York granted Louis
Vuitton’s motion for summary judgment on trademark dilution.181
Even though consumers may associate a trademark used in
product placement with a character or plotline, today’s astute
audiences still recognize that the trademark exhibited is likely to be
part of some larger marketing scheme.182 In fact, as seen through
the tweets in Louis Vuitton v. Hyundai, they often believe that
every brand portrayed must have either approved its use or paid for
the screen time.183 Therefore, they are more likely to believe this
brand-scene association was approved and voluntarily
sponsored.184 The Second Circuit found in Louis Vuitton v.
177

See Stempel, supra note 174.
See Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV.
L. REV. 809, 829 (2010).
179
Louis Vuitton, 2012 WL 1022247 at *8.
180
Id. at *12–13.
181
Id. at *14.
182
See Radford, supra note 111 (“[C]onsumers . . . recognize ads for what they are.”).
183
See Louis Vuitton, 2012 WL 1022247, at *11; see also William McGeveran, The
Trademark Fair Use Reform Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2267, 2310 (2010) (explaining that
viewers believe markholders are able to prevent their marks from being depicted in media
as product placement).
184
See McGeveran, supra note 183, at 2310.
178
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Hyundai, however, that no matter the symbolic importance
associated with the use of a particular trademark, the markholder
was entitled to retain control over how its mark was being
portrayed and what it was appearing to sponsor.185 This circuit has
previously held that a senior user is never required to leave the
strength and quality of its mark in the hands of another.186
Accordingly, a senior user may enjoin a junior user who is adeptly
managing its own business and causing no harm to the mark.187 In
fact, courts have found that when the goods of a junior user are of
a similar quality to those of a senior markholder, consumers are
often more likely to blur the relationship between the two
companies.188 The risk that consumers will be deceived and alter
their perception of a mark due to the control exercised by mediamakers has encouraged some courts to find dilution as a result of
unsponsored product placement.189 Other courts, striving to find
artistic relevance, have found ways to excuse the unauthorized use.
D. Courts Have Found that Consumers Can Dissociate a Brand’s
Meaning from its Association in a Movie or Television Show
Courts are more willing to find artistic use when they consider
the reasonably prudent person standard, and hold that someone
who is reasonably intelligent, discriminating, and careful can

185
See Louis Vuitton, 2012 WL 1022247, at *13–14 (pointing out that Hyundai used
Louis Vuitton’s mark to enhance its branding campaign and that Hyundai’s previous
letters requesting the rights to the marks of thirteen companies indicates that Hyundai
knew it did not have the right to use the Louis Vuitton mark to portray luxury).
186
See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259–60 (2d Cir.
1987); U.S. Polo Ass’n v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 515, 537 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (citing James Burrough, Ltd. v. Ferrara, 165 N.Y.S.2d 825, 826 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1957)). In 1928, Judge Learned Hand wrote on behalf of the Second Circuit that a
trademark is an “authentic seal; by it he vouches for the goods which bear it; it carries his
name for good or ill. If another uses it, he borrows the owner’s reputation, whose quality
no longer lies within his own control. This is an injury, even though the borrower does
not tarnish it, or divert any sales by its use; for a reputation, like a face, is the symbol of
its possessor and creator, and another can use it only as a mask.” Yale Elec. Corp. v.
Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928).
187
See Pegasus, 818 F.2d at 259–60.
188
See Steven John Olsen, Mixed Signals in Trademark’s “Likelihood of Confusion
Law”: Does Quality Matter?, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 659, 677 n.58 (2010).
189
See Louis Vuitton, 2012 WL 1022247, at *13.
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discern sponsored from unsponsored uses.190 This is in part
because goods are typically viewed in a narrow context.191 Just as
the words spoken in a conversation help listeners hone in on what
is being discussed, details of the setting, plot, and dialogue permit
individuals seeing trademarks in product placement to distinguish
the brand’s reputation from the context in which it is being
portrayed.192 Such explanatory context was found to exist in
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., a case revolving around Walt
Disney’s unauthorized use of Caterpillar bulldozers in the film
George of the Jungle 2.193 The Caterpillar bulldozers assisted in
the evil villain’s efforts to destroy Ape Mountain.194 The Central
District of Illinois found that viewers, even the more gullible ones
such as children, would recognize that Caterpillar bulldozers were
not “maniacal machines,” responsible for the attempted destruction
of Ape Mountain.195 Similarly, trademark scholars like Mark
McKenna found it unlikely that the scene in the NBC television
show Heroes, where an InSinkErator garbage disposal crushed a
main character’s hand, had tarnished the InSinkErator mark.196
Viewers could likely disassociate the mark from the television
show.197 In fact, dilution requires a mark to still be able to
distinguish itself from its surroundings.198 Therefore, as Laura
Heymann, a professor at William and Mary Law School, argues,
neither positive nor negative uses of a mark in product placement
will affect the brand’s reputation in such a way that it causes
trademark dilution.199 This argument would allow judges to avoid

190

See McKenna, supra note 60, at 83–84 (“[T]he confusion [is] generating search
costs only if we think the mental act of wondering is the search cost.”).
191
See Tushnet, supra note 11, at 529–30.
192
See id. at 531 (noting that the ability to distinguish between the brand and its
nontrademark descriptive meaning, as seen with Swift, Life Savers, and Ivory, is based
upon it being seen in a categorical product context versus in the abstract).
193
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913 (C.D. Ill. 2003).
194
Id. at 917.
195
Id. at 922.
196
See David Goetzi, Emerson Drops Product Placement Case Against NBC, MEDIA
POST (Feb. 23, 2007, 8:33 AM), http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/55990/
emerson-drops-product-placement-case-against-nbc.html#axzz2HKKWSpmc.
197
See Heymann, supra note 1, at 1390–91.
198
See id. at 1397.
199
Id. at 1397–99.
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deciding whether the use is commercial, and dismiss dilution on
other grounds.200
E. Courts Have Exempted the Use of a Trademark in
Unsponsored Product Placement as a Parody
When a trademark is displayed as a parody in product
placement, the use is not actionable under the TDRA.201 While
these uses sometimes seem to cause harm to the mark and
markholders, courts are hesitant to leap from parody to tarnishment
because negative uses are typically found to be expressive rather
than commercial.202 This was seen where the Muppets character
Spa’am, a pig, was not found to be a “grotesque boar” that was
“unhygienic” and tarnishing the SPAM trademark, but rather
deemed “untidy” and a parody of the canned ham lunchmeat.203
When Family Guy featured a caricature of Carol Burnett mopping
the floors in a sex shop as the theme song to the Carol Burnett
Show played in the background, the Central District of California
was quick to label the use an artistic work meant to “lampoon and
parody her as a public figure.”204 Although not product placement,
in Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., even the sale of t-shirts, mugs,
underwear, teddy bears, and bumper stickers adorned with phrases
meant to associate Walmart with Al-Qaeda and Nazis, was found
to be non-commercial.205 Although the shirts were being sold on
the Internet, their essential function remained as a medium of
expression rather than a profit-making venture.206
200

See Caterpillar, 287 F. Supp. 2d at 922 (deciding against trademark dilution by
tarnishment without considering whether the use was artistic or commercial).
201
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii) (2012).
202
See Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1014 (referencing the TDRA’s tarnishment
protection which only protects against commercial uses). But see Louis Vuitton Malletier,
S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, L.L.C., 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007) (clearing a nontarnishing parody of liability on account of being humorous, in spite of its largely
commercial nature).
203
See Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods. Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 501, 503 (2d Cir.
1997) (finding Spa’am to be a humorous character in line with Henson’s other Muppet
parodies).
204
See Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962, 969 (C.D.
Cal. 2007).
205
Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1339–40 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
206
See id.
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In some cases, simply creating a witty parody has been enough
to overcome a trademark dilution action.207 One court was so
tickled by a parody that it ignored the crude nature of a joke and
explained that its “unsavory or controversial quality [would] render
the parody less capable of causing public confusion and therefore
less susceptible to infringement liability.”208 While a court will
almost certainly find parody protection for a wholesome comedy,
where the humor is more taboo, the outcome appears to depend on
the tastes and predilection of the deciding court.209 The laughter
induced by the Chewy Vuitton toys proved sufficient to drown out
any claims of dilution.210 The Southern District of New York also
found the humor apparent enough to differentiate Timmy
Holedigger pet perfumes from those of Tommy Hilfiger, and label
the use a parody.211 Humor theory explains that social norms help
to establish what society finds funny, so it can and often does
guide litigants, attorneys, and courts in deciding whether to view
an unpermitted trademark use as a parody.212
Although parody should remain an exception to the TDRA, as
parodies become more offensive, like the one in Smith v. Wal-Mart
Stores, marks will be harmed.213 Scholars have noted the trend in
courts to exempt such uses from liability as tarnishment.214 This is
207

See Assaf, supra note 55, at 63.
Laura E. Little, Regulating Funny: Humor and the Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1235,
1268–69 (2009); see also Burnett, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 972–73; Rosenblatt, supra note 20,
at 1014 (noting that observers of the negative parody are unlikely to believe the
markholder approved or sponsored the portrayal).
209
See Assaff, supra note 46, at 64–66; see also id. at 63 (noting a case in which a
movie referenced a brand “BUFU,” “By Us, Fuck You,” which the good-humored judge
concluded to be a protected parody of the trademark “FUBU,” “For Us, By Us,” and a
“UFUB” cause of action, “Utterly Frivolous Under Biopsy”).
210
See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, L.L.C., 507 F.3d 252, 267
(4th Cir. 2007).
211
See Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, L.L.C., 221 F. Supp. 2d 410,
417 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (looking to phrases on the packaging that read “[s]trong enough for
a man, but made for a Chihuahua” or “T. Holedigger keeps your best friend smelling
fresh and clean” to reaffirm the comedic and parodic nature of Nature Labs’ pet
perfumes).
212
See Little, supra note 208, at 1284 (“[P]arody is an integral component of American
culture that should be treasured and protected, even in the face of a claim of harm.”).
213
See Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1316 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
214
See Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1074.
208
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perhaps in part because of the murky terrain of unsponsored
product placement.
In response to the discrepancy in courts’ treatment of
trademarks in unsponsored product placement, I propose the
creation of a rule.
III. FAMOUS TRADEMARKS USED IN PRODUCT PLACEMENT SHOULD
BE DESIGNATED A COMMERCIAL USE
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes very wisely pronounced that
“‘[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth [of an
artistic work], outside the narrowest and most obvious limits.’”215
Katya Assaf, a professor of Law at the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem, explained that not only do judges differ in what they
qualify as art, but different judges also have different senses of
humor and accordingly vary in what they label a parody.216
Rosenblatt further explained that where an entertainment use
primarily features product placement, courts struggle over whether
to consider the purpose to be advertisement or noncommercial.217
Accordingly, there should be a bright line rule that unsponsored
product placement is a commercial use. This rule provides narrow
limits as Holmes recommended. Considerations in reaching this
decision include: (1) the need for markholders and media-makers
to know when they may use a trademark, (2) the media’s position
as an instrument of commerce, and (3) reputational concerns for
brands who desire to preserve the goodwill in their marks and
cannot rely on sophisticated consumers to discern the truth.
Without the protection provided by markholders’ prior approval,
trademarks used in unauthorized product placement face the threat
of dilution.

215

Gulasekaram, supra note 131, at 913–14 (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903)).
216
Assaf, supra note 55, at 60.
217
Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1059.
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A. Lack of a Bright Line Rule Has Resulted in Confusion Among
Markholders and Media-Makers
In deciding whether there has been dilution, the TDRA has
judges consider “[t]he extent to which the owner of the famous
mark is engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark.”218
Without such protection, a trademark may become generic.219
Louis Vuitton was adequately found to protect its mark due to
evidence that it “‘initiated’ 9,489 anti-counterfeiting raids and
26,843 anti-counterfeiting procedures,” and responded to Customs
Seizure Notices with 217 cease-and-desist letters in 2009.220 Then
in 2010, it sent an additional 499 cease-and-desist letters.221 The
degree of protection Louis Vuitton exerted in policing its mark
resulted in Hyundai’s unauthorized use being labeled dilutive.222
The understood need to protect one’s mark causes trademark use in
unapproved product placement to wind up in newsrooms and
courtrooms.
A recent incident of unsponsored product placement breaking
into headlines demonstrates this uncertainty. The movie Flight
repeatedly shows Denzel Washington’s alcoholic character
drinking Budweiser beer, on one occasion even while he is driving
a car.223 This use had not been approved by Anheuser-Busch, and
the company is accordingly requesting its trademark be blurred or
otherwise obscured.224 For Paramount, the decision was likely the
result of Budweiser’s brand identity—it is a beer that they felt a
middle-aged, unpretentious character might prefer.225 Having the
character reach for a Budweiser perhaps seemed more realistic.226
218

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(iii) (2012).
See, e.g., Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2007);
Premier Nutrition, Inc. v. Organic Food Bar, Inc., No. SACV 06-0827 AG (RNBx), 2008
WL 1913163, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2008).
220
Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10 Civ. 1611 (PKC), 2012
WL 1022247, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012).
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
See Brooke Olaussen, Who Controls Trademarks in Films?, INTELL. PROP. BRIEF
(Nov. 24, 2012, 5:10 PM), http://www.ipbrief.net/2012/11/24/who-controls-trademarksin-films.
224
See id.
225
See id.
226
See id.
219
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For those in the Anheuser-Busch camp, however, there is likely the
apprehension that viewers think every product used on screen has
been approved, and therefore will think this incident of product
placement is evidence of Budweiser endorsing alcoholism and
drunk driving.227 Stolichnaya has made similar complaints
pertaining to the screentime given to its vodka.228 To preserve the
Budweiser and Stoli trademarks from dilution, these incidences of
unsponsored product placement should be held commercial uses
that necessitate the markholders’ prior approval.
Establishing a rule that makes the use of a trademark in product
placement a commercial use that requires the markholder’s
permission, is consistent with dilution law. Under the TDRA, a
markholder seeking to prevent dilution must police its mark’s
use.229 The question of whether to regulate a trademark’s use
should not be a guessing game, where media-makers and
markholders must decide when they can employ, and
correspondingly when they must protect, the use of a mark in
product placement. Rather, authorization prior to exhibiting a
mark should be required in all situations except those explicitly
stated. The TDRA currently exempts comparative advertising,
parody, criticism, comment, news, and noncommercial uses from
dilution law.230 However, as media moves online, televisions
advance to integrate the Internet, and product placement of famous
marks serves an intrinsic advertising function, it has become clear
that the use of a mark in product placement must be found
commercial.
B. Unsponsored Product Placement in Media Should be Likened
to the Internet and Similarly Made a Commercial Use
The Internet is regulated as a commercial use under the
Lanham Act.231 Accordingly, where media is nearly always
available over the Internet and where televisions connect to the
Internet, television programming must similarly be labeled a
227
228
229
230
231

See id.; see also McGeveran, supra note 183, at 2310.
See Perkins, supra note 113.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(iii) (2012).
Id. § 1125(c)(3).
See supra text accompanying notes 32–39.
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commercial use. Beyond simply connecting to the Internet,
televisions are even beginning to function like the Internet.232
Therefore, unsponsored product placement featured in movies and
television must be found a use in commerce that requires the
markholder’s approval to be displayed.
1. Media is Streamed Online
In a world where so much of media is concurrently distributed
over the Internet, the media viewed must be found as a commercial
use as anything else viewed over the Internet.233 Netflix’s CEO
publicly predicted the company to continue losing DVD
subscribers every quarter as online media streaming takes focus.234
Laptops often do not even include DVD drives anymore.235
Instead, people stream movies, or acquire them through the
Internet.236 The situation is similar in the realm of television
shows. Hulu and network-operated websites allow viewers to
stream shows to their computers at any time.237 Alternative
232

Smart televisions enable viewers to watch Internet videos and socialize with friends
online from their televisions. See Anick Jesdanun, Coming to a Smart TV near You:
Software Confusion, NBC NEWS (Jan. 6, 2014, 5:11 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/
technology/new-software-battle-coming-smart-tvs-2D11869282. Additionally, programs
like Oohly allow someone viewing content on a television that connects to the Internet to
select and purchase the clothing and props featured in a scene directly from their
televisions. See also Alex Knapp, Oohly Wants to Kill the TV Commercial Forever,
FORBES (Apr. 16, 2012, 12:46 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/alexknapp/2012/04/16/
oohly-wants-to-kill-the-tv-commercial-forever. Thus a viewer may conduct an Internetlike search and make an online purchase without ever leaving the couche to exchange the
remote for a laptop with Internet access.
233
See supra note 231.
234
See David Pogue, How Hollywood is Encouraging Online Piracy, SCI. AM. (Aug.
21, 2012), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=how-hollywood-encoura
ging-onine-piracy.
235
See id.
236
See id.
237
See Gary Levin, Prime Time Seeks a Future in a When-You-Want-it World, USA
TODAY (Nov. 15, 2012, 7:59 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/life/tv/2012/11/15/tvwatching-in-more-places/1661293. The ability to stream can result in increased
viewership. See Richard Sandomir, Live (Streaming) From Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6,
2014, at B16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/06/sports/olympics/livestreaming-from-sochi.html?hpw&rref=sports&_r=0 (noting that the ability to watch the
Olympic games on a laptop increased daily viewership from 4 hours and 19 minutes to 4
hours and 28 minutes a day; adding in a mobile phone increased that number to 5 hours;
and adding a tablet increased viewership to 6 hours and seven minutes).
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options include purchasing shows or seasons through iTunes,
Netflix, YouTube, HBO Go, and a paid version of Hulu.238
Accordingly, where so many people are tuning into the Internet for
their media fixes, television, movies, and the trademarks exhibited
in product placement must similarly be viewed as commerce under
the Lanham Act.
2. Televisions Often Connect to the Internet and Thereby
Function as Instruments in Commerce
Beyond simply being streamed online, many modern
televisions are now even connected to the Internet.239
Accordingly, televisions must be labeled instruments of
commerce—they are items that facilitate commercial
transactions.240 Emerging programs, such as Oohly, permit
televisions to provide much the same function as an Internet
search.241 This application, for example, will permit viewers to
purchase the products featured in the show they are watching while
they are watching it or, alternatively, return later to search for the
product they saw.242 In these instances, unsponsored product
placement is functioning much like an advertisement.
The finding that unsponsored product placement is an
advertisement, however, does not hinge only on whether a
television is connected to the Internet. Because the TDRA only
protects famous marks from dilution,243 and such marks have
“extensive public recognition and renown,”244 their presence alone
serves an advertising function. Trademark dilution protects the
communication value in a name, and famous designers have earned
238

See Levin, supra note 237.
See Sean P. Aune, Internet Connected TVs Expected to Hit 650 Million by 2017,
TECHNOBUFFALO (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.technobuffalo.com/2012/08/02/internetconnected-tvs-expected-to-hit-650-million-by-2017 (noting that 650 million televisions
are expected to be connected to the Internet in 2017, an amount that should yield $60
billion in sales).
240
See supra text accompanying notes 27–38.
241
See Knapp, supra note 232.
242
See id.
243
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2012) (allowing injunctive relief only “after the owner’s
mark has become famous”).
244
Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 353 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
239
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the household recognition that merits this protection from
dilution.245 Therefore, whether connected to the Internet or merely
relying on its own fame, the use of a mark in unsponsored product
placement is an advertising use in commerce. To further explain
this, a comparison to keywords might prove helpful.
Consider the similarities between the use of a famous mark in
unsponsored product placement and the similarly deceptive use of
a trademark as a search engine keyword.246 When a person
searches a trademarked term on the Internet, if that mark is a
search engine keyword, the results will engender the
advertisements of the companies who have purchased that
keyword, alongside or even preferential to those of the true
markholder.247 This risks deluding searchers into believing the two
companies are perhaps related. Comparatively, viewers using
applications like “Get the Look” are presented with similar, often
more affordable looks, which may mislead consumers as to the
actual designer of the product.248 Furthermore, programs like
Oohly and “Get the Look” then provide the ability to purchase the
merchandise.249 As Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit explained,
“[i]n a commercial environment, distribution and payment are . . .
like love and marriage—you can’t have one without the other. If
cards don’t process payments, pirates don’t deliver booty.”250 This
ability to later purchase the featured merchandise makes the
product placement commercial. Televisions have become an
instrument of commerce. One example of such deceptive product
245

See Landes & Posner, supra note 18, at 307.
See Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137,
1144 (9th Cir. 2011).
247
See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 2009).
248
See, e.g., U.S. Showbiz, MAILONLINE, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/usshowbiz/
index.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2014) (providing “Get the Look” links on several
pictures).
249
See id.; see also Knapp, supra note 232; Snooki’s Designer Bags Given to Her by
Luxury Rivals, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 19, 2010, 10:59 AM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/19/snookis-designer-bags-col_n_687583.html [hereinafter
Snooki’s Designer Bags]. In the scenario with Snooki and her handbags, viewers might
think these designers endorsed the use and, accordingly, the show.
250
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv., Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 818 (9th Cir. 2007)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (discussing vicarious liability in a copyright case where
controlling payment was found by Judge Kozinski to be an essential part of the
infringement).
246
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placement that was not sponsored by the actual owner of the mark
can be seen in the Jersey Shore.
Snooki became a household name because of the Jersey Shore,
and in Season One she could be seen toting her Coach handbag
everywhere she went.251 Coach had not paid for this use and was
not happy with how its mark was being portrayed.252 Prior to the
start of Season Two, she was sent a smorgasbord of new handbags
to wear, but again, these purses were not sent to her by their
respective designers.253 Rather, they were sent by other luxury
designers, including Coach, who were eager to prevent their own
bags from being associated with either Snooki or the Jersey
Shore.254 This act of “unbranding” used other recognizable luxury
trademarks to deceive consumers.255 Viewers would recognize the
famous trademarks on any of the bags designers had offered to
Snooki and be deceived into finding sponsorship.256 Much like in
the case of keywords, were this use to be found noncommercial,
product placement would be allowed to continue using trademarks
to deceive consumers.257 Instead authorization should be required
before a mark may be used in product placement. This will further
protect the trademark from losing the goodwill in its reputation.

251

See Nunlee, Smith & Katz, supra note 173, at 11.
See Adam Fusfeld, Sleazy Celebs Inspire Brilliant New Marketing Strategy –
“Unbranding”, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 25, 2010, 11:50 AM), http://www.
businessinsider.com/snooki-is-so-bad-for-fashion-pr-that-she-inspired-an-evil-newstrategy-2010-8.
253
See id.; see also Nunlee, Smith & Katz, supra note 173, at 11.
254
See Buckland, supra note 252.
255
See Snooki’s Designer Bags, supra note 249.
256
See id.
257
See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he
operators of search engines would be free to use trademarks in ways designed to deceive
and cause consumer confusion.”).
252
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C. Unsponsored Product Placement Harms a Trademark’s
Reputation Because Sophisticated Consumers Cannot See
Beyond the Deception
Today’s media has tremendous implications because it reaches
infinitely many more people and does so at an incredible speed.258
While this has its advantages in times of disaster,259 political
elections,260 and perhaps in the case of celebrity love lives, it also
has its disadvantages—misinformation accompanies every piece of
Therefore the truth behind incidences of
information.261
unsponsored product placement is not always clear on the Internet.
This problem would be solved if product placement was found to
be a commercial use that required the markholder’s approval.
Instead there are instances such Abercrombie and Fitch’s
public announcement of its request for the “Situation,” another cast
member on the Jersey Shore, to discontinue wearing its apparel.262
Over one thousand members of the press took to their laptops to
comment and respond.263 While many thought this to be a
258

See, e.g., Tom Martin, Marketing at the Speed of Sound, CONVERSEDIGITAL (Dec.
20, 2012), http://www.conversedigital.com/digital-strategy/podcasting-statistics-trendsfuture.
259
Compare Jerry Barmash, Former WNYW Anchor Jim Ryan Felt ‘Sick Feeling’
Covering Events of 9/11, FISHBOWL NY (Sept. 7, 2011, 11:00 AM), http://www.
mediabistro.com/fishbowlny/former-wnyw-anchor-jim-ryan-911-anniversary_b36819
(noting the first news on the 9/11 terrorist attacks was broadcasted just two minutes after
the first plane crash), with Radio Reports Japan’s Attack on Pearl Harbor, MODESTO
RADIO MUSEUM, http://www.modestoradiomuseum.org/radio%20reports%20pearl.html
(last visited Nov. 3, 2012) (informing that Pearl Harbor was attacked a little before 7:55
AM HST but news of this was not broadcasted on major news until 30 minutes later).
260
See Truth-O-Meter, POLITIFACT.COM, http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/
statements (last visited Nov. 3, 2012) (indicating the truthfulness of statements made
during the political campaign).
261
See Luke Allnutt, Why We’re More Likely than Ever Before to Believe Fake News,
RADIO FREE EUR. RADIO LIBERTY (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.rferl.org/content/whywere-more-likely-than-ever-before-to-believe-fake-news/24701144.html.
262
See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion and Memorandum of Law in
Support of their Motion to Strike Irrelevant Material and Unsupported Allegations from
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 15, MPS Entm’t, L.L.C. v. Abercrombie &
Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 11-CV-24110-LENARD/O’SULLIVAN, 2012 WL 3869091 (S.D.
Fla. July 16, 2012) [hereinafter the Complaint]; The Latest ‘Situation’ for Abercrombie &
Fitch and Jersey Shore, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 19, 2011), http://fashion.telegraph.co.uk/newsfeatures/TMG8710673/The-latest-Situation-for-Abercrombie-and-Fitch-and-JerseyShore.html.
263
See Complaint, supra note 262, ¶ 17.
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publicity stunt on the part of Abercrombie and Fitch, there was,
and remains to be, no certainty.264 Information is simply not
always available. When a Mad Men episode had a Jaguar
executive promising to accept the advertising firm’s representation
in exchange for sex with a member of the firm, the actual Jaguar
tweeted its response, in hopes of disassociating the car company
from the unauthorized product placement.265 The only problem
with its rejoinder lies in the fact that 34.5% of the population is on
neither Facebook nor Twitter, so it is doubtful they would ever see
Jaguar’s tweet.266
Additionally, studies show that people with strong opinions are
more likely to stand firmly in their convictions when faced with
mounds of opposition.267
This response, known as belief
perseverance, strengthens as the amount of information
contradicting one’s beliefs grows.268 Further, by the reasoning
applied in the aptly called Law of Incorrect Tweets, “[i]nitial,
inaccurate information will be retweeted more than any subsequent
correction.”269
The breadth of available misinformation is
especially troublesome because researchers have found that people
are growing more gullible.270 And, this dilemma is only inflated
because everything posted on the Internet lives on forever.271
Accordingly, being a sophisticated consumer may no longer be
264

See id.
See Christopher Rosen, ‘Mad Men’ & Jaguar: What the Car Company Thinks About
Its Shocking TV Portrayal, HUFFINGTON POST (May 30, 2012, 11:41 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/30/mad-men-jaguar-response_n_1556053.html.
266
See id.; see also Lauren Dugan, One Third of the US Population Says “No” to
Twitter and Facebook, MEDIABISTRO (Sept. 10, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://www.
mediabistro.com/alltwitter/one-third-us-population-not-on-twitter-facebook_b28182.
267
See Carrie Arnold, Diss Information: Is There a Way to Stop Popular Falsehoods
from Morphing into “Facts”?, SCI. AM. (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.
scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=how-to-stop-misinformation-from-becomingpopular-belief.
268
See id.
269
Allnutt, supra note 261 (citing Craig Silverman, Visualized: Incorrect Information
Travels Farther, Faster on Twitter than Corrections, POYNTER (Mar. 7, 2012, 10:55
AM), http://www.poynter.org/latest-news/regret-the-error/165654/visualized-incorrectinformation-travels-farther-faster-on-twitter-than-corrections).
270
See id.
271
See John Friedman, You Are What You Tweet, REUTERS (June 20, 2011, 1:18 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/20/idUS364190237020110620.
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enough to isolate a trademark’s reputation from how it has been
portrayed in unsponsored product placement.
Companies spend tremendous amounts of money building up
their reputations, often paying more on their marketing
investments than on the product or service itself.272 They strive to
give their brands cultural significance by investing in advertising
and marketing efforts.273 For example, the corporate executive
owners of major fashion houses spend billions of dollars trying to
entrance the public.274 They often stage ornate and provocative
million dollar runway shows.275 Collectively, these owners spend
billions more on bold advertising campaigns.276 Designers dress
celebrities for red carpet events to get authentic sounding publicity
and sponsor events such as Chopard at Cannes and Louis Vuitton
at the America’s Cup to further align the brand with the essence of
all things luxury.277 Similarly, colleges looking to protect their
brands have been seen to deny permission to producers and
directors that seek to use the school’s clothing in horror movies
and teen comedies emphasizing sex, drugs, and rock and roll.278
At least 200 colleges have even hired public-relations firms to
monitor whenever their schools are mentioned in television, film,
and the news.279 This allows schools to disassociate themselves
from any negative, unauthorized associations.280 Each of these
brands chooses its connections with particularity so that it may
prevent its marks from being diluted by any negative affiliation.
The goodwill preserved in a brand’s reputation gives it
symbolic meaning in product placement. In fact, the “artistic
message” for which viewers tune into movies and television
272

See Assaf, supra note 55, at 29.
See id.
274
See DANA THOMAS, DELUXE: HOW LUXURY LOST ITS LUSTER 9 (Penguin Books
2007).
275
See id.
276
See id.
277
See id.
278
See Julia Love, Despite Colleges’ Efforts, Brands Can Escape Their Bounds, THE
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 1, 2012), https://chronicle.com/article/Colleges-BrandsEscape-Their/134764.
279
See id.
280
See id.
273
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shows,281 would not be conveyed but for the famous, quickly
recognized brands lending their identities to the production.282
Brands have an identity and can implicitly relay stereotypes and
other notions of cultural significance, thus they are essential tools
to use when introducing a character to an audience.283 For
example, the car in which a mom drives her children to school will
be different than the car a high-powered CEO takes to work. Both
cars are a vehicle of truth, relaying information about the character
and the brand. Just like people, every trademark has a unique
personality, and much like the old adage “you are who you hang
out with,” a mark is also defined by its associations.284 So what
happens when an incident of unendorsed product placement
assigns the trademark to a character who poorly reflects upon the
brand?285 Such associations, especially when consumers believe
they were paid for, risk blurring the two marks or tarnishing the
senior mark.286 Accordingly, to prevent such dilution, trademark
use in product placement should be labeled commercial and only
permitted once a markholder’s approval has been obtained.

281

See Gulasekaram, supra note 131, at 936.
See Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1026–27 (asserting that brand inclusion is
necessary “for purposes of verisimilitude”). Contra Gulasekaram, supra note 131, at 936
(arguing brands are not necessary to the creation of an artistic production).
283
See Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1026–27; see also, Tiffany-Twisted Definition,
URBAN DICTIONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Tiffany-Twisted
&defid=4019309 (last visited Nov. 4, 2012).
284
See Brand Personality Definition, BUS.DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.
businessdictionary.com/definition/brand-personality.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2012)
(listing some common brand personalities, including “uniqueness, sincerity,
intellectualism, competence, excitement and sophistication” and explaining that these
help consumers relate to the brand); see also Joel H. Steckel, Robert Klein, & Shelly
Schussheim, Dilution Through the Looking Glass: A Marketing Look at the Trademark
Dilution Revision Act of 2005, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 616, 623–24 (“[A] brand’s reputation
is derived from what people think of it . . . [or] its associations. Damage to associations
then can also harm the reputation of a brand.).
285
See Nunlee, Smith & Katz, supra note 173, at 14.
286
See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10 CIV.1611 PKC,
2012 WL 1022247, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012); Burberry Ltd. v. Euro Moda, Inc.,
No. 08 CIV. 5781 (CM), 2009 WL 1675080, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2009) (noting
that a trademark may be tarnished when it is associated with a product of lower quality or
when it is portrayed in a negative light).
282
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CONCLUSION
As Landes and Judge Posner argued in their famous article on
trademark dilution, “people conceal their undesirable
characteristics in order to create or protect such [reputational]
capital,” so there should be no opposition to allowing trademarks
to “flaunt their desirable characteristics.”287 This is especially
important because a trademark is intended to create a lasting
impression on consumers.
Trademarks trickle into our
communicative culture and “fill gaps in our vocabulary and add a
contemporary flavour to our expressions.”288 Therefore, all marks
should be allowed to put their best selves forward. The
associations made through unsponsored product placement,
however, end up dictating the self that is portrayed to the public.
By permitting someone other than a markholder to dictate a
trademark’s reputation, trademarks are essentially redefined with
each incident of unsponsored product placement, thereby leaving
the voids in our vocabulary unfilled.
While it may seem that the problem of reputational harm can
be addressed on a case-by-case basis, this solution is inadequate.
The cost of litigation is high, both monetarily and reputationally.
Moreover, markholders are often hesitant to litigate positive
association,289 presumably because it seems pointless to reject free
advertising and because markholders fear that a judge may render
their mark invalid.290 And without litigation to put viewers on
notice of the unauthorized product placement, viewers end up
presuming that the markholder has endorsed the use.291 Because
trademarks help to structure language, however, it is evident that
each unapproved usage, positive or negative, impacts the ultimate
definition and characterization of the trademark. The result is
287

See Landes & Posner, supra note 13, at 308.
Kai Falkenberg & Elizabeth McNamara, Using Trademarked Products in
Entertainment Programming, 24 COMM. LAW. 1, 14 (2007) (quoting Mattel, Inc. v. MCA
Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002)).
289
Id. at 19.
290
See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445,
457 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded sub nom. Christian
Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012)
(“[T]he Court has serious doubts that Louboutin possesses a protectable mark . . . .”).
291
See Falkenberg & McNamara, supra note 288, at 19.
288
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necessarily dilution. For this reason, trademark use in product
placement should be made a commercial use under the Lanham
Act and only permitted after the markholder’s approval has been
obtained.

